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1.  Introduction
The European Community  (EC) was  founded in  1957  by  the Treaty  of  Rome.  The
original member  countries were France, W. Germany,  Italy, Belgium, Netherlands,
and Luxembourg.  In  1973,  the United Kingdom, Denmark,  and  Ireland  joined  the
Community.  The second enlargement  is  underway  to  include Greece,  Spain and
Portugal.  Greece is  already a full member.  Spain and Portugal will become  full
members  soon  (cf.  figure  1).
The European Community used  to  be a net  importer  of  many  important  agri-
cultural commodities.  Over  time  supply  has  grown  at  a much higher rate  than
the  demand and  the EC  has  now  become a major net  exporter  of  many  agricultural
key commodities.
Budgetary  expenditures  have  grown tremendously and  caused a persistant
budget  crisis  in  the Community.  This  has  contributed  to  political  disputes
within  the EC,  whereas  the  export  development has  been subject  to  harsh  criti-
cism by  the U.S.  and  other food exporting countries.  The U.S.  has  even  con-
sidered retaliation and  some experts  are afraid of  (another)  trade war  between
the EC  and  the U.S.
In  the following  I will give a survey  of  the  central principles  and effects
of  the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  First,  I will  outline  the macro-
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Figure 1:  THE MEMBER COUNTRIES  OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
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economic and agricultural situation  in  the EC.  Second, I will analyze
the major  economic effects  of  the  CAP  and  finally, I will discuss  the
forces  that underly  the decisions  on agricultural price support  in the
Community;  among others I will argue that  the U.S.  has pursued macroeconomic
as  well as agricultural  policies which have  contributed to a comparatively
high price support  in the EC.-4-
TABLE  1:  POPULATION AND  PER CAPITA GNP  IN  THE  EC
AND  THE U.S.,  1981
COUNTRY  GNP  (U.S.$)  POPULATION(millions)
France  12,190  54.0
West Germany  13,450  61.7
Italy  6,960  56.2
Belgium/Luxembourg  11,930  10.3
Netherlands  11,790  14.2
United Kingdom  9,110  56.0
Ireland  5,230  3.4
Denmark  13,120  5.1
Greece  4,420  9.7
EC-9  8,330  260.9
EC-10U  8,190  270.6
U.S.A.  12,820  229.8
Source:  World Bank, Eurostat.
1) EC-9  plus Greece. 
\2.  The Macroeconomic Environment and  the Agricultural Situation  in the  EC
According  to  the world bank  classification all member countries  of  the
Community could be considered industrialized.  Although any  comparison  of  the
GNP  between  the U.S.  and  the EC  is  influenced by  the exchange  rate  of  the  U.S.  $
against European currencies  it  is  clear that  the  level of  economic development
(as  measured by  the GNP)  is  higher in  the  U.S.  than  in the EC  as  a whole.  The
differences  in per  capita GNP  within the Community  are  considerable;  some
countries  such as Denmark, Germany, France, Netherlands  and Belgium/Luxembourg
are comparable  to the U.S.  whereas  the U.K. and especially Italy,  Ireland  and
Greece  are characterized  by  a significantly  lower level  of economic  development
(table  1).  On average  7.6  percent  of  all  employed persons were employed in
agriculture in  1981.  Again, there  are considerable  differences,  ranging  from
30.7  percent  in Greece  to  less  than 2 percent  in Belgium (EC Commission,  1984),
indicating the differences  in  the level of  economic  development within the
Community.
Agricultural  land  is  relatively  scarcer in  the EC than  in the U.S.  While
the population of  the Community exceeds  the one of  the U.S.  by 14  p.c.  (EC-9)
and  18  p.c.  (EC-10) respectively  (table 1)  the  land used for agricultural  pro-
duction represents  less  than one  fourth of  the  agricultural  land in  the U.S.
(table 2).
Agricultural production has  grown faster than  domestic demand because  of
technical progress and price  support policy.  The EC  is  now  a net  exporter of
many  important agricultural  commodities such  as  wheat,  barley,  sugar or  dairy
products  (table 3).TABLE 2:  UTILIZED AGRICULTURAL LAND  IN THE  U.S.
AND THE  EC  (1982)
COUNTRY  UTILIZED AGRICULTURAL LAND (MILLION HA)
France  31.7











Source:  EC Commission.
1)  1980.TABLE  3 : DEGREE  OF  SELF SUFFICIENCY  IN CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES,
1980/81-1982/83
COMMODITY  EC-9  EC-10
total  cereals  103  103
excluding rice)
total wheat  118  119
barley  114  113
grain maize  66  66
sugar  136  n.a.
whole milk powder  )  )  393  377
skimmed milk powder  126  126
concentrated milk  177  154
butter  )  119  118
beef  104  103
pig  meat  101  101
poultry meat  110  110
Source:  EC Commission.
1)  Average 1980-1982.
2)  Includes whole milk powder for  Italy.-8-
Table 4 presents  agricultural export  and  import  figures.  Despite agri-
cultural protectionism, agricultural  trade  of  the  Community has  been growing
considerably.  Total third  country  exports  and  total  imports  from third
countries have increased by  about 350  and 200  percent respectively  in ten years.
The  volume  of agricultural  imports still exceeds  the volume  of  exports.  The EC
is  still  the most  important  single country  importer  of  agricultural  commodities
in  the world and  the U.S.  is  the  most  important  importer  of  the  EC.  In  19b2,  20
p.c. of  total agricultural  imports  to  the Community  came from  the U.S.
Important  agricultural import goods  of  the  Community are  fruits  and vegetables,
animal feed, oilseeds,  coffee,  cocoa and  tea.  Despite a wheat surplus  the  EC
still imports  a considerable  amount  of  high quality wheat.
The EC  supports  agricultural prices  of  most  of  the domestically more
important  agricultural commodities on  a level that  has  normally  been con-
siderably above the world market  level.  The agricultural income  problem,
however, remains.  Real agricultural incomes  in  the Community have  on average
been declining during  the  last  couple  of  years,  (figure  2) whereas  non-agri-
cultural incomes  have  been growing at  a rate  of  about  2.5  percent  annually  in
real  terms.
Another characteristic of  agricultural  income  development over  time  might
be  surprising, too.  Despite  the  fact  that  there is  a Common Agricultural Policy
the growth  rates  of  real incomes  differ significantly between the member states.
While agriculture  in some  countries  enjoyed a real income growth  the  farm sector
in others  have been  facing income  reductions.  There are  three  major reasons  for
this  phenomenon.  First,  uniform agricultural prices  do  not  result  in  uniform
agricultural incomes,  income  growth  rates,  or sectoral income  disparities.
Second, inflation  rates  differ considerably,  and  third,  the EC  has  introduced-9-
TABLE 4:  VOLUME-/ OF EC  IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES
(MILLION  ECU)
IMPORTS  1973  1983
total world  39,857  94,338
total  intra EC-9  15,486  46,437
total  extra EC-10  24,371  47,901
U.S.A.  4,187  9,533
EXPORTS
total world  22,639  72,323
total intra EC-9  15,258  46,171
total  extra EC-9  7,381  26,152
U.S.A.  1,222  3,152
Source:  EC Commission.
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a system of  so  called Monetary Compensatory  amounts which result  in nationally
diverging price support  levels  and price  adjustments  in  the  Community.-
Table 5 contains  the  clue for  the existence of  an  agricultural income
problem:  Farms  in the  EC are  on  average  rather small.  Although part  of  the
difference in farm size between the U.S.  and  the EC might  be  due  to differing
definitions  of  the  "utilized agricultural area",  and  physical  farm size  is  only
a rough  indicator for  the economic  farm size,  there should be  no  doubt  that  the
average  farm in  the U.S.  is  significantly  larger than  the average farm in  the
Community.  The  central reason  for  the small structured agriculture  in  the  EC  is
the  support  of  agricultural prices  which has  delayed structural  change  towards
farms  that  are  (more)  competitive  on  the world markets.
There are  large differences  in  average farm size  between  the member
countries  of  the Community,  They  are mainly  due to  three  factors, namely  non-
agricultural  income  (T.W. Schultz,  1953;  Peters  and Schmitt,  1973),  pre and  post
EC agricultural  policy,  and differences  in the quality  of  production  factors
including physical  and economic  land quality.  In  countries such  as  Greece and
Italy,  with a comparatively  low  level of  nonagricultural incomes  a relatively
small farm can secure a sufficient standard  of  living.  The  above average  farm
size  in Ireland, which  is  characterized  by  a  comparatively low  level  of  economic
development,  could in part  be  explained by  its  relatively  long distance  from the
consumers  of  the Community.  Although  the  nonagricultural income  in the  United
1/  Monetary  Compensatory Amounts  are  basically  intra-community  tariffs  on
agricultural  goods.  They  result  in differences  in  the  level  of  price
support  between  the  member states.  For  details  on Monetary Compensatory
Amounts  cf.  e.g.  Schmitz  (1979),  Ritson  and Tangermann  (1979),  heidhues  et
al.  (197b).-12-
TABLE  5:  AVERAGE FARM SIZE  IN  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE  U.S.,  1980
AVERAGE FARM SIZE IN HA OF
COUNTRY  UTILIZED AGRICLTURAL AREA
France  25.4











Source:  EC Commission.-13-
Kingdom is  below average  farms  are  large;  this  is  due  to  two  facts,  namely  that
the United Kingdom pursued a policy  of  low  price support  before  it  joined  the
Community  in 1973  and  that  the United Kingdom employed negative Monetary
Compensatory Amounts  (MCAs) most  of  the  time after it  had  become a full  member
which resulted in a price  support  that has  been below EC average.  At  times  sup-
port  prices  in the United Kingdom were more  than 30  percent  lower  than  the
official EC support  prices  (e.g. Fennell,  1979).  The opposite  is  true as  far  as
West Germany is  concerned.  The  level  of  economic development  there  is  far
above,  but  farm size  is  below EC average.  Before  the  CAP  became  fully effective
West Germany  supported agricultural prices  on a level  that was  higher  than in
all other member  countries.  This  characteristic continued after  1967/68  because
West  Germany employed mostly  (the highest of  all)  positive MCAs  in  the
Community.-14-
3.  Goals  and Principles  of  the  CAP
The goals  of  the  CAP are  set  out  in Art  39  of  the Treaty  of  Rome.  They
are:
a.  to increase agricultural  productivity  by promoting technical  progress  and
by insuring  the  rational development  of  agricultural production  and  the
optimum utilization  of  the  factors  of  production,  in particular  labour;
b.  thus  to  ensure a fair standard of  living for  the agricultural  community,
in particular by  increasing the individual earnings  of  persons engaged
in agriculture;
c.  to stabilize markets;
d.  to assure  the availability  of  supplies;
e.  to ensure  that  supplies  reach  consumers at  reasonable prices.
The central  aim appears  to  be  the  agricultural income goal.  Its  definition
is,  however, rather  vague  and allows  various  interpretations.  In the  early
years  of  the  EC this  goal was  to  equate average agricultural  and average  non-
agricultural  income.  When  the  importance  of  sectoral income  differences  for
structural adjustment  of  agriculture  had  become generally  accepted the most
widely  held interpretation was  that  average agricultural  income  should be
somewhat lower  than average income  but  that  both should grow  at  about  the  same
rate.
The goals  of  the CAP  shall  be achieved  by  three  basic  policy  principles,
namely:  (a)  market unity,  (b)  Community preference,  and (c) financial  soli-
darity.  Market unity implies  above all  that  any  distortions  of  trade within
the Community  should  be  removed, whereas  Community preference means  that
there should be  a common protection against  imports  from third countries.
The first  two principles  constitute a customs  union.  The third principle-15-
implies, generally  speaking, that  the  CAP  should be  financed jointly.  How this
should be  done in detail  has  remained rather unclear.  While some  share  the view
that  the member countries  should get  out what they  paid in,  others'  perception
of  this  principle is  that  the financial burdens  of  the CAP  (EC) should be
defrayed according  to  the member  countries' economic wealth, i.e.  that  there
should be  some redistribution  from rich  to poor  member countries.  As will  be
discussed later  the net  transfers of  the CAP  between the member  countries  in
conjunction with the  financial system of  the Community  does not meet  any  of
these principles.4.  The  Institutional Framework of  the EC
The institutional framework  of  the  Community deviates  significantly from  those
typical  in Western democracies.-/ Four major bodies  are  the  Commission,  the
Council of  Ministers, the European Parliament,  and  the European Court  of Justice.
The Commission is  the  executive  branch of  the  EC,  and  has  (a) to  ensure
that  the provisions of  the Treaty  of  Rome  are  observed, (b)  the  right  to  make
recommendations  and  give opinions,  and  (c) to participate actively  in Council
and Parliament  decisions.  The  Commission also put  forward proposals  for  agri-
cultural market  regime price  adjustments  for the  annual Council's  price  nego-
tiations.
The Council of  (Agricultural) Ministers  is  the  body  responsible  for
(agricultural policy) decision making  in  the EC.  According  to  the  Treaty of
Rome,  most decisions,  including agricultural  price  policy decisions,  may  be  made
on  the  basis of  a qualified majority.  Unanimity  is  only  required  if  the  'vital'
interests of  at  least  one member  country  are at  stake.  What  vital is  has  simply
to  be  stated by  the  respective  member  country.  In  the EC-10, West  Germany,
France, Italy,  and  the United  Kingdom have  1U  votes  each;  Belgium, Netherlands,
and Greece 5 each;  Ireland  and Denmark  3 each,  and Luxembourg 2.  Majority
requires 45  out  of  the  total of  b3  votes.  Hence,  the  four  "large" member
countries  cannot  outvote  the majority  of  the  six  smaller  countries,  and  a coali-
tion of  two  large  countries  can block  any  (majority) decision.
The Common Agricultural Policy became fully  effective in  1967/6b,  but  as
early  as  1965  the  permanent  controversy over  the  decision rule  peaked  as  France
declared all  decisions  as  so  important  for  her national  interests  that  the  una-
1/  i'or  details cf.  e.g. Fennell  (1979);  Harris  et  al.  (1983).-17-
nimity  rule must  be  applied-  and withdrew from  the Council  of  Ministers  tor  six
months,  thus  blocking  any  decisions  in  the EC  during that  period.  The member
countries  then agreed  to  the so  called Luxembourg  compromise in which they
"agreed to  disagree".  The factual outcome  of  this  compromise has  been  that  the
unanimity  rule  is generally  applied.
Since  that  time virtually all  decisions  have  been made unanimously,
resulting  in very  time  consuming  decisions  and more  or  less  comprehensive
package  deals.  An attempt  by  Italy  in  1970  to  return to the  majority decision
rule  as provided  by  the EEC Treaty  (1957)  failed.  An interesting exception  that
attracted much public attention was  made  in 1982  when consent  over the  adjust-
ments  of  agricultural prices  was  reached  but  not  over compensation  payments  that
the United Kingdom was  seeking.  The  majority  of  the  Council members  argued  that
these were  basically two  separate  issues  that  should  be  voted on  separately.  As
consent  was  already  achieved  over agricultural price  adjustments,  this  issue was
considered to  be  in  accordance with the Luxembourg  compromise  and  the  problem of
compensation payments  for  the  United Kingdom was  postponed.
The  interests  of  the member  countries  in  the  CAP  differ.  In  the  course of
two enlargements  the  number of  member  countries  has  increased from 6  to  10  and
the  divergencies  in  interests  have  been growing,  too.  Consequently  it  has
become more and more difficult  and  time  consuming  to  make unanimous  decisions.
Once Spain and Portugal have  become full members  of  the  Community the unanimity
decision rule will  become  even more  impractical  (Runge and  von Witzke,  1985).
As  from 1979  the European Parliament  (EP)  is  directly elected.  In  the
EC-1U  it  has  435  members.  France,  Italy,  the UK  and  West Germany  have  1L  members
1/  For  details  cf.  EEC  Treaty  (1957),  Articles  8, 84,  99,  LOU,  212,  235;
von der Groeben, von  Broeckh, and Thiesing.  (no year).-18-
each;  Netherlands 25;  Belgium and Greece  24  each;  Denmark 16,  Ireland 15;  and
Luxembourg 6.  At  present  the political power  of  the EP  is  rather  limited as  the
Council of Ministers is  the decision making  body  in  the Community.  Basically
the EP can (a) address questions to  the Council  and  the Commission, (b)  may pass
resolutions,  (c) is  to be  consulted  by  the Council, and  (d) has  limited  control
over parts  of  the Community budget.  In fact,  it  could only  delay but  not
finally block budgetary  issues.
The Court of  Justice  is  the  EC judicative and  has  to ensure  that  the provi-
sions  of  the  relevant Treaties and  the Council  desisions  are  observed.  The
Court  is  competent for Community  institutions  as  well as  for  decisions by  the
member countries  that are  not  in accordance with Community law.  Despite the
fact  that  the Court  of  Justice does  not  have the  power  to enforce its  rulings
against national measures, the member  countries  tend  to  comply with  its  judge-
ments.-19-
5.  Instruments and Effects  of  the CAP
5.1  Price Support
As mentioned before  the central  goal  of  the CAP  is  to  reduce  the  disparity
between agricultural and  non-agricultural income.  This goal  is  pursued  by  a
support  of  agricultural  prices  on a  level which has usually  been  far above world
market prices.  The pivotal  instrument employed  is  a system of  variable  levies,
so  called  intervention prices,  and  export  subsidies  ('export  refunds').
Figure 3 illustrates  the  basic principles  and  effects of  the  CAP.  Si
represents the  domestic supply curve  and Sm is  the  import  supply  curve.  An
horizontal addition of  S  and Sm yields  the  total  supply curve  St.  In the
absence of  any price  support  the domestic price  is  identical  to  the world market
Price P  .
w
The  so called  threshold price P  which  is  a minimum import  price is  fixed
s
above P  The difference  between P  and whatever the world market  price  is,  is
w  s
made up  by  a variable  levy.  Consequently the  new  total  supply  curve St is
identical  to  Si below  Ps,  completely  elastic at  Ps,  and  identical  to St above
the  threshold price.  because of  the  price support domestic  production
increases, and imports decline.  As  the  EC  is  a large  country  in economic  terms
the  reduced imports  of  the Community have  a negative impact  on  the  world market
price.  in  figure 3  the new world market price  is  P  and the new levy  per unit
w
imported is  P -P
s  w
US agriculture depends  to  a large extent on what  happens  on  the world
markets  of  agricultural commodities.  hence, lower world market  prices  have a
negative effect  on Ub  agriculture  and US  agricultural exports.  Empirical  stu-
dies  of  the world wheat  market  indicate that  world market  prices  would  be  about
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1982)  and  that  the  EC alone accounts  for about  80  p.c.  of  total  price policy
related world price depression on  this  market.  A removal of  agricultural  pro-
tection on  the grain markets would  reduce  production in  the  Community by  about
4U  percent whereas  the  production in major  grain exporting  countries would
increase  by  6 percent (Koester, 1982).
In addition  to  its  effect  on  the  world price  level the  CAP  has  a negative
impact  on world market  price stability  which  for  obvious  reasons  negatively
affects US  agriculture, also.  As  the domestic  price in  the Community  is  not
affected  by world market  price fluctuations,  domestic sppply  and demand  remain
unchanged.  In  the absence  of  the CAP,  increasing (declining) world prices would
partly  be  compensated by  growing  (declining) EC  supply and  declining
(increasing) demand.  Hence, world market  price  fluctuations  are  higher  than  in
the absence of  the CAP.  Moreover, the domestic  supply  fluctuations  in the
Community  do not affect  domestic prices.  The price fluctuations  that  would
otherwise  occur are  thus  simply  'exported'  to  the world market and  contribute
to world price instabilities,  too.  Estimates  indicate that  the  fluctuation  of
world wheat prices  in terms  of  the standard deviation would  decline  by  about  20
p.c. if  the EC were to  remove the  CAP.  This  is  about  50  p.c.  of  the  total price
policy related world price  instability  (Sarris  and Freebairn,  1983).1/
As mentioned before,  the  EC  used to  be  a net  importer  of  most major  agri-
cultural commodities.  Due  to  technological progress  in conjunction with  the
2/ CAP production has grown considerably-  and  the Community  has emerged  as  a net
I/  For  a more  detailed analysis  ot  the  impacts  of  the  CAP  on world
market price  fluctuations  cf.  Koester  (1982).
2/  A price support  accelerates  technical  progress  because  it  increases
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exporter  of  many  key  commodities  and a major  competitor on  traditional US  export
markets.
Figure 4 illustrates  this  situation.  At  Ps  domestic supply  exceeds
domestic  demand.  As  the  agricultural prices  are supported  via import  restric-
tions P  could no  longer be  maintained and the  domestic price would  be  Pi.  In
order  to maintain the  desired domestic price  level Ps  the  EC has  defined a so
called Intervention Price at which unlimited EC  buying  takes  place.  This price
is  slightly lower  than P  (adjusted for  transportation costs)  in  order  to  avoid
s
imports when domestic supply exceeds domestic demand.  If we  assume for  con-
venience of  graphical illustration that the  intervention price is  equal  to  the
threshold price P  the  resulting domestic demand  curve D' is identical to D
above Ps  and completely  elastic at  Ps.
The surplus production  (q 
) is  bought  by  the  EC and  either destroyed
The surplus  production  (q  -q  ) is  bought  by  the  EC  and  either  destroyed
as  in  the  case  of  certain fruits  and vegetables  or  stored  for  some  time  and
eventually sold on the world market.  As  the  surplus production  is not  com-
petitive at P  the  EC  pays  export  refunds  (export subsidies) which make up  the
difference between the  intervention  price and  the world market  price.
The budgetary  consequences of  the  CAP  and  its  impact  on social welfare  are
illustrated in  figure 5.  For  convenience  of  graphical  illustration it has  been
assumed that  there  are neither  exports  nor  imports  at  P . The surplus  produc-
tion qs-qd  is  bought by  the EC  at  Ps.  The  budgetary  consequences  depend on  the
form of  surplus disposal.  If  the surplus production  is  destroyed total  budge-
tary expenditures  are  equivalent  to  the  area qd AB qs.  They  are  represented  by
ABGGF  if  it is  sold on  the world market.-
1/  If the  degree  of  self-sufficiency  is  below  IUO  percent  there  are  govern-
ment  revenues via  variable levies.-24-
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The welfare effects  of  the  CAP  also depend on  the  form of  surplus  disposal.
Compared to a tree trade  situation farmers  realize a gain in producer  surplus
represented  by P BhPw while consumers  loose P AHP . If the  surplus is subsi-
dized and  sold on  the world marketi  the  government loss  is ABGF and consequently
there  is  a loss  in social welfare  represented by  the  two triangles AHE  and  BCH,
and  the rectangle ECGF.  If  the  surplus production  is  destroyed  the  loss  in
social welfare  grows  by  qd FG qs.  It  can be  concluded that  the  redistribution
to  the agricultural sector via  the  CAP  is  not a zero  sum game  and  that  there is
a deadweight  loss:  producers  gain less  than  consumers and government  lose.
5.2  Budgetary Expenditures
Budgetary expenditures  have  been growing tremendously  in  recent years  and
have  created political  disputes  between the member countries.  The  budget  is
financed  by  revenues  from tariffs  (predominantly from imports  of  non-
agricultural goods)  and variable  levies,  some direct  national contributions,
and own  resources (VAT)  (cf.  table  b).  The most  important  financial  source
are  the  own  resources and  tariffs.- / While  the  relative  importance  of  the
VAT means  is  gaining, the  portion of  levies  has  been declining due  to  the
growing  surplus production.
The own  resources are  transfers from the  member countries  to  the Community.
They  are based  on  the  valuation of  the  value added  tax  (VAT), a measure  that  is
similar to  the GNP.  The VAT  means  establish a budget  ceiling  because  they must
not  exceed a certain percentage of  the VAT  basis  of  valuation  (78-85:  1 p.c.;
8b  onwards:  1.4  p.c.
1/  Storage costs  are  neglected  here.
2/  For details  cf.  Buckwell et  al.  (1982);  Petersen  (1983).-26-
Table 6:  FINANCIAL  IEANS OF THE  EC,  198U-1985.




mill.  ECU  15166.6  17479.0  21240.6  23200.5  26660.0  25692.4
of  which
(in p.c.)
- tariffs  38.9  36.6  32.9  30.1  29.6  31.5
-levies  13.2  10.0  10.5  9.9  11.9  9.2
-VAT  47.9  52.6  56.6  59.1  53.9  58.3
- financial
contributions  .0  .9  .9  .9  .8  .9
- additional
financing  - --  .-  3.8  n.a.
VAT
rate  in p.c.  .73  .79  .92  1.00  1.00  .98
Source:  EC Commission.
I/  Total EC revenues  contain additional  financing in  the  amount  of  1003.4
million ECU.
2/  Council  draft budget.-27-
The VAT  rate  in table 6 indicates  that  the  EC  has  been operating  close  to
the  budget  ceiling since  1982.  In  1984  the  budget constraint was  exceeded and
additional financing was  necessary.  The draft  budget for  85  indicates  that  the
budgetary  tensions  in  the Community have  not  yet  been solved.  Unanticipated low
world market prices,  a lower value of  the US $ and/or high  yields  in  the
Community might well  lead  to  a situation  in which additional financing might  be
unavoidable again  (cf.  later).
Most  budgetary expenditures  are  due  to  the CAP  (table  7).  Between  1980  and
1985 about  two  thirds  of  budgetary means  have  been used  to  finance  this  policy.
In  some years,  CAP  expenditures  reached almost 75  p.c.  of  total  financial means.
Among CAP  related expenditures,  the  financing  of  price support  is  by  far  most
important.  Expenditures  for  structural adjustment  policies  have always  been
below 4 p.c..
Table 8 contains  the  budgetary  expenditures  of  the EAGGF-  Guarantee
Section for certain market  regimes.  Most costly  in  budgetary  terms  are  the
price  support  of  dairy  and grain  production.  In an attempt  to  reduce  the
expenditures  caused  by  the  dairy market  regime,  the  EC  introduced domestic
production quotas  in  1984.  Although the  quota was  not  enforced, production
declined because farmers  actually  expected  that  the quotas would  be  enforced.
For  1985  the EC  has announced  that  the quota system will  be  enforced.  Whether
it will actually  be enforced and  whether  the  farmers will  believe  that  it  will
be,  remains  to  be  seen.
The expenditures  for  fruits  and  vegetables, oils  and  fats  (olive),  and wine
do  not  play a major role  yet.  However,  this  will change  when the  new  member
1/  European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance  Fund.  Price Policy  is
financed by  the EAGGF Guarantee Section whereas  strucutral  policies  are
financed by  the Guidance Section.-28-
Table  7:  BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 1980-1985
(in p.c.).
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  19851)
price support
2 ) 69.4  61.5  59.9  58.0  67.6  69.5
structural
adjustment in3)
agriculture  3.7  3.2  3.2  2.6  2.3  2.5
total  CAP 
expenditures  73.1  64.7  63.1  60.6  69.9  72.0
others 5) 26.9  35.3  36.9  39.4  30.1  28.0
total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  EC Commission.
1)  Council draft  budget.
2)  European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund,  (EAGGF), Guarantee
Section.
3)  EAGGF, Guidance Section.
4)  EAGGF.
5)  Regional policies,  social policies,  development aid,  research
expenditures, federal administration etc.-29-
Table a:  EXPENDITURES  FOR PRICE  SUPPORT ON  CERTAIN MARKETS  IN P.C. OF
TOTAL  PRICE SUPORT RELATED  EXPENDITURES,  1980-1985.
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  19851
total grains  14.8  17.5  14.2  15.3  10.5  14.8
dairy  42.0  30.4  26.8  27.6  31.6  28.5
beef  12.0  13.1  9.4  10.9  11.2  11.5
sugar  5.1  7.0  10.0  8.3  8.7  7.7
fruits and
vegetables  6.1  5.8  7.4  7.5  7.3  6.5
oils  and
fats  6.1  9.3  9.8  10.2  8.9  11.2
wine  2.6  4.2  4.6  4.1  6.0  3,1
others  11.3  12.7  17o8  161l  15.8  16.7
total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  EC Commission.
1) budget  draft.-30-
countries  have adjusted  their production to  the CAP  (e.g.  Schmitt  and von
Witzke, 1981).
5.3  Intracommunity Transfers
The intracommunity transfers  caused by  the  CAP  in conjunction with  the
financial system have  also resulted in major controversies.  The member
countries  contribute  to financing  the EC  according to  the level  of  their
economic wealth  (via VAT means)  and  they get  back according  to  their  level of
production.  Consequently,  those countries  that  produce much relative  to  their
economic wealth are  net  recipients and  those  that  produce  little relative  to
their economic wealth are  net  payers.  Hence,  it  is  not necessarily  the  case
that  relatively  poor countries  are  net  benefitters and  comparatively rich
countries  are  net payers.-
Table 9 summarizes  the  net  transfer effects.  They have  fluctuated con-
siderably over time,  because  of  fluctuating yields  and  changing  differences
in the  level of  price support  via Monetary  Compensatory Amounts.  Nevertheless,
some  constant  patterns  can  be  recognized.  The United Kingdom and West Germany
have always  been net  payers.  While  Germany  has  frequently requested a limita-
tion  of  its payments,  the direction of  net  transfers  could be  considered in
accordance with general  principles  of  redistribution.  UK's GNP  is  about
average;  however,  it's  net payments  are  even higher than Germany's.  The net
position of  some countries with an above  average GNP  such  as  Denmark,
Netherlands, Belgium/Luxembourg,  and  (in more  recent periods)  France  is posi-
tive.
1/  For  details  cf.  Buckwell  et  al.(1982);  Koester  (1977).-31-
Table 9:  NET INTRACOMMUNITY TRANSFERS OF EC PRICE SUPPORT1 ) 1976-1982
(mill. ECU)
Country  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982
France  -151.1  - 41.5  -154.4  303.7  637.9  945.3  004.7
West Germany  685.4  -616.3  -128.7  -733.7  -924.7  -10004.1  -1221.2
Italy  181.4  163.2  - 50.3  412.4  440.8  563.2  986.9
Belgium/
Luxembourg  -30.4  222.6  30.4  81.0  1134.7  -120.3  -124.2
Netherlands  221.0  150.9  218.1  440.5  610.9  388,1  528.7
United Kingdom  -218.5  61.1  -555.5  -1268.3  -1461.6  -1245.3  -1605.1
Ireland  137.5  359.5  277.1  378.7  461.6  347.3  387.2
Denmark  244.5  268.8  365.7  383.8  356.7  295.7  3121o
Source:  Petersen (1984).
1) Incl. Monetary Compensatory Amounts.-32-
6.  Interactions  between Policy Decisions  in the  EC  and  the U.S.
Policy  decisions  in general and  agricultural  price policy  decisions  in
the EC as  well  as  in  the US  more  specifically  are endogenous  rather than
exogenous,  (for details  cf.  von Witzke, 1985).  Because  the  agricultural
income  problem is  the  central motivation  for  the  CAP,  the  development of  farm
incomes  affect  support  prices.  Comparatively  low  (past)  agricultural income
growth  is  followed  by  relatively high  price adjustments  and  relatively  high
income growth is  followed  by comparatively modest  price  decisions.  However,
agricultural  income is  not  the  only variable that  determines CAP  decisions
as  there  is  a political price  of  the  agricultural  price support  in  the
Community.  This  political  price is the  budgetary  burden caused  by  the CAP  as
evidenced  by  persistent  political disputes  over  the EC  budget.  Modest  budget
growth rates  result  in  comparatively  high  price increases,  and  high expenditure
growth  is  followed  by  modest  adjustments  of  market  regime  prices.
The tollowing  eqs.  (1) - (5) describe a very simple  model  of  budgetary
expenditures  in  the Community.  For  simplicity  it  has  been assumed  that  there  is
only  one agricultural  good and  that  budgetary  expenditures  are  caused  only by
refunds  paid  for  the  export  of  the  surplus  of  this  commodity.  The following
symbols  are used:
B = budgetary  expenditures
ECU P  = support price  in  the  EC  in ECU
Pl  = world market  price  in  ECU w-33-
P  = world market price  in USS w
ER = ECU/S  exchange  rate
Sq = surplus production in  the  EC  (supply minus  demand at  pECU)
s
W  in front  of  a symbol denotes  a growth  rate.
(1)  B = Sq  . (ECU  - pECU)
s  w
Eq.  (1) expresses  the  budgetary expenditures  in the  Community  as  the  product  of
surplus  production and  export refund  per unit where  the  refund  is  the  difference
between ECU  support price  and ECU  world market  price.  The world price  in ECU
could  be  decomposed into the  USS  world  price and  the  ECU/$  exchange  rate.
(2)  pEU  = P  . EK w  w
hence  eq.  (1) becomes
(3)  B - Sq  . (pEU  p$ . ER) s  w
and in growth  rates
(4)  WB = WSQ + w * WPC  - (w-l) . (WP  + WER) s  w
where
pECU
(5)  =  -s  > 
pECU  p  . ER
s  w
All other  things  being equal eq.  (4) indicates  that  increasing  (decreasing)
US  ?  world market  prices  and a growing  (declining) value  ot  the  US  $ have  a
negative  (positive) impact  on  budgetary  expenditures  in  the  Community.  The
reduced  (increased)  expenditures  in  turn  contribute  to  relatively  high  (low)
price increases  in  the Community.-34-
The strength  of  the US  $ has  eased  the  budget  problems  of  the Community,
resulting in higher  levels  of  agricultural price support  in  the EC.  At  the  pre-
sent  exchange  rate-/ the  EC pays very  low export  refunds.  A decline  of  the
value of  the US  $ against  the ECU  would significantly aggravate the  budgetary
problems  of  the EC and  contribute  to a reduced level of  agricultural  price  sup-
port  (and perhaps  to additional production quotas).
2/
The US  agricultural  policy has  also helped  the EC.  The PIK-  program and
similar instruments  had a significant  negative  impact  on US  production,
resulting in  comparatively higher world market  prices.  This  has  reduced  budge-
tary  expenditures  in the EC,  contributing  to relatively high  price  support  in
the Community.
The  increased surplus  of  the  EC  lowers world market  prices  and thus  contri-
butes  to agricultural income problems  in other  countries and/or additional
income  measures  there.  Assuming  that  these  third  countries are  not  small  in
economic  terms  (such as  the U.S.),  and  that  they  introduce measures which reduce
their  supply  of  agricultural  commodities  (such  as  a PIK  program),  then it beco-
mes  obvious  that  such  a policy  in turn contributes  to  relatively  high growth
rates  of  guaranteed agricultural  prices  in  the  EC...
1/  In  spring 1985 the  refund  for wheat was  about  20  US  $ per  metric  ton.
Z/  Payment  In  Kind.-35-
7.  Final Remarks
Overall the Common Market's agricultural  production  is  well protected.
However, the wall of  agricultural protection has  some improtant  holes.
Soybeans,  soybean meal,  and oil,  and  some grain substitutes  such  as  corn gluten
feed enter the Community  at  very  low or  zero  tariffs which were  negotiated
under the GATT in  the early  60's.
These agreements  produce  a significant price  and  trade  loophole.  The  rela-
tively low  price of  soybean  oil inside  the  EC enhances the  consumption of
margarine and  similar products  relative  to  domestic butter which is in  chronic
surplus  and requires  tremendous  budget  means  for export  refunds.
Similarly,  relatively  cheap protein meals  and  corn gluten feed  substitute
the  relatively  more expensive domestic  feedgrains and  hence  contribute to  the
budgetary expenditures  of  the  EC.  In other words, the CAP  has  some significant
negative effects  on US  agriculture,  but  there  are  some markets where  the  US
clearly  benefits from  the  CAP.
Despite assistance  by  the  US  $ and  the  US  agricultural  policy  the  EC  has
remained under financial  pressure  and  is seriously contemplating  policy  alter-
natives  to  ease  the budget  crisis.  Larger national contributions  of  the member
countries  and  new production quotas  for  milk  have already been  agreed upon.
Additional policy modifications being  considered include (i) a tax on  the  con-
sumption of  oils  and fats  other than  butter  and  (ii)  import  restrictions  on
grain substitutes.  Of  course,  this  would additionally  affect US  agriculture.
It  is  not  surprising that  the  US  in  turn considers  retaliation.  However,
increased protectionism in  the  EC and  eventually US  retaliation would  make  both
political entities worse  off.-36-
It  appears  that  these  disputes  are heavily  influenced by  two  US mispercep-
tions  of  the  CAP.  The first  one  is  the  view that  the establishment  of  the  CAP
gave rise to agricultural  protectionism.  In  fact,  the variable  levy  system
replaced various national import  restrictions.  In many  cases  the national
measures  of agricultural  price support were more  restrictive than  the  levy
system.  In  other words,  in  the absence  of  the CAP  there would  be  national
measures  of  agricultural  trade restrictions  in Western Europe.
The  second misperception is that  the  EC  is protectionist  in agricultural
policy and  the US  is  a free  trade purist.  At  present  exchange  rates  (Spring 85)
the EC support  price  level of  wheat  is slightly  lower  than  the US wheat  price.
The sugar market  is basically  as  tightly regulated here  as  in  the EC.  The price
of  dairy  products  in the  US  is  even higher  than in  the  EC.
The point  in fact  is  that  the US,  almost  from the  beginning of  the GATT,
unilaterally  proclaimed its  exclusion from the GATT  principles  for  agricultural
trade.  The US  has  repeatedly  threatened to  take  the  EC to  the  GATT  on agri-
cultural  issues,  but  these  threats didn't  really  scare the EC  because  it  has
been the US  who has  insisted on  ignoring  the  provisions  of  the  GATT  on  agri-
cultural issues.-37-
References
A.  E. Buckwell, D. R. Harvey, K. J. Thompson,  and K. A. Parton,
The Costs  of  the  Common Agricultural Policy.  London, Canberra
1982.
Council of Economic Advisors  to the Federal Government, Jahres-
gutachten 80/81.  Wiesbaden  1980.
E  C Commission,  Report on  Agriculture.  Brussels,  various  volumes.
Eurostat,  Review.  Luxembourg,  various  volumes.
R. Fennell, The Common Agricultural Policy  of  the European Community
London, Toronto  etc.  1979.
S. Harris,  A. Swinbank,  and G. Wilkinson, The  Food and  Farm Policies  of
the European Community.  Chichester,  New York etc.  1983.
Uo  Koester, "The Redistributional Effects  of  the Common Agricultural
Financial System".  European Review of  Agricultural Economics
4  (1977):  321 345.
U. Koester, Polic  Options  for the Grain Economy  of  the European
Community:  Implications  for Developing Countries.  (IFPRI
Research Report  14)  Washington, D.C.  198U.
W. Peters  and G.  Schmitt,  "Interregionale Einkommensunterschiede
in  der Landwirtschaft."  Agrarwirtschaft 22  (1973):  381-392.
C. Ritson and  S. Tangermann, "The Economics  and Politics  of  MCAs".
European Review of  Agricultural Economics 6  (1979):  119-164.
C.  F. Runge and H. von Witzke, Institutional Innovation in  the
European Community.  Staff  Paper,  Dept.  of  Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University  of  Minnesota,  St.  Paul  1985.-38-
G. Schmitt, Technical Progress,  Agricultural Policy, and Returns  to
Agricultural Research.  Dept.  of  Agricultural  and Applied Economics,
University of  Minnesota, St.  Paul  1985  (mimeograph).
G. Schmitt and H. von Witzke,  "Ausgestaltung der Agrarpolitik in
Abhaengigkeit vom Entwicklungsstand  der Volkswirtschaften".
Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik in  einer erweiterten Gemein-
schaft.  R. von Alvensleben, U. Koester, and H. Storck  (eds.),
Muenster-Hiltrup  1981:  47-64.
P. M. Schmitz,  "EC Price Harmonization:  A Macroeconomic Approach".
European Review of  Agricultural Economics  6 (1979):165-190.
T. W. Schultz, The Economic Organization of  Agriculture.  New York
1953.
H, von der Greoben, H. von Boeckg,  and J. Thiesing, Kommentar zum
EWG- Vertrag  (no year).
H. von Witzke, "Endogenous Supranational Policy Decisions:  The
Common Agricultural Policy  of  the European Community".
Public Choice  (forthcoming).
World Bank, World Development Report  1983.  New York, Oxford 1983.